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Rebecca Comay
Why should only idealists be permitted to walk a tightrope,
while materialist tightrope walking is prohibited?
Waiter Benjamin
I. Secularizations
No idealist, but only a materialist deliverance from myth
Benjamin
What could be at work in the Marxist rendition of the theological prohibition of images?
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno explicitly binds the by now familiar critique of repre-
sentation (mediation, mediatization, the society-of-the-spectacle) to the secular impera-
tive to "grasp the object itself" [die Sache zu begreifen] in its corporeal truth. Such a
"grasp" would seem to re-inflect the theological longing for redemption along decid-
edly a-theological lines:
It is only in the absence of images that the full object could be conceived. Such
absence concurs with the theological ban on images. Materialism brought that ban
into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured; this is the
substance of its negativity. At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree
with theology. Its great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh, a desire utterly
foreign to idealism, the realm of the absolute spirit. (ND 207/207)
I propose to use this startling passage - a formulation which seems to announce nothing
less than the recoil of the ascetic ideal upon itself - as a starting point to re-examine the
well-rehearsed debate between Adorno and Benjamin.
What are we to make of this unholy marriage of theology and materialism? It will in
any case be more than a question of finding vague parallels or surreptitious borrowings
(an easy dig at Marxism as chiliastic "creed" or "dogma," a familiar nod towards the
Jewish return-to-history): a question not of compatibility nor of complicity, but rather
of an "agreement" forged precisely where the antithesis would seem most intractable.
For according to such a refunctioning of the monotheistic prohibition, the apparent
56 Rebecca Comay
mortification of the senses would come to signal not the familiar pay-off of super-
sensuous fulfilment - the sublime passage from physical blindness to spiritual insight
(Oedipus, Teiresias) - but rather the vindication of the body itself at the very point of
its most irreparable disfiguration. At its limit, then, materialism is said to absorb or
reinscribe theology precisely in speaking of a restitution beyond every idealizing com-
pensation and in this sense intransigently unconsoling.
How does the iconoclastic imperative get attached here to the promise of resurrec-
tion? And how would each or both, together or apart, withstand the temptation of other-
worldliness? If the redemption of the suffering body precludes any representation or
mediation of its singularity, this could only imply a kind of return outside the restricted
economy of a salvation predicated on the compensatory exchange of commensurable
abstractions. It would thus imply something other than the spiritual metamorphosis of
a body raised to divine immortality, rationality, and apatheia. It would, in short, indicate
the persistence of matter in its utterly unreconciled alterity.
Such redemption would therefore suggest something other than the theiosis of the
perfected individual formed in the image of the incorruptible divine. This latter notion
would inevitably substitute for the banished idol the essentialized image of an incor-
poreal God. Spiritual insight would redeem the blindness of corporeal vision.1 "Image
of the invisible" (Colossians 1:15), the apparition of Christ would present the possibility
of a vision ultimately purified of sensuous immediacy and thus the very promise of
spirit's victory over dead matter. The transfiguration of the Pauline grain of wheat-
"sown in humiliation, raised in glory" (1 Corinthians 15:44) -presupposes the divine
oikonomia of a redemption mimetologically secured through the figure of Christ as
imago Dei and thus guaranteed to humanity precisely as bearer of the heavenly "stamp,"
"seal," or imprint.2
What would it mean to articulate the Bilderverbot without recourse to the sublimated
mimetology of idealism? And what would a non-transfiguring resurrection begin to
look like? It would be here tempting but misleading to quickly confront a "Christian"
with a "Jewish" eschatology - Ezekiel's dry bones pitted against the spiritual body of
St. Paul, the mended pot of the Sanhedrin3 pitted against Augustine's recast statue - in
order to mark the essential terms of opposition. The philosophical challenge of think-
ing a non-reconciling restitution remains nonetheless pressing.
"Redemption" as Benjamin writes (the allusion here is to Kafka), "is no reward or
recompense for existence but the last way out" [die ErlOsung ist keine Prdmie auf das
Dasein, sondern die letzte Ausflucht ... ] (II.2.423;ILL 125). At stake here is not the re-
turn of spiritual commensuration but rather a rupture all the more radical in being
premised on an imperceptible difference - a "slight adjustment" [eine Geringes zurecht-
stellen] (II.2.432;ILL 134) - between this world and the next. Whatever the "weakness"
of the Messianic power (1.2.694;ILL 254) - the angel of history cannot linger, cannot
awaken the dead, cannot make whole what has been smashed, and so on (1.2.697f;
ILL 257) - the very identification of the Messianic with the domain of transience or
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"downgoing" (II.1.205;R 313) (the Nietzschean overtone is unmistakeable) would sug-
gest that redemption cannot be thought beyond or apart from the eternal return of bod-
ily remnants or remainders, without totalizing compensation. If the dead cannot be
revived this is no doubt for the same reason that they cannot be said to properly or
securely die: "Even the dead are not safe from the enemy if he wins ...." (I.2.695;ILL
255).4 Our permanent rendez-vous or assignation with "past generations" (I.2.694;ILL
254) indicates precisely the tenacity of dead matter as that which haunts the plenitude
of the living present. "Living on" [Oberleben] becomes thus the perpetual obsolescence
that at once both defines and subverts tradition.
Adorno will evoke Kafka somewhat similarly. If the theory of the "unsuccessful
death" (Odradek, Gracchus) "is the sole promise of immortality ... permit[ted] to sur-
vive the ban on images" (P 286/270f), the very possibility of redemption would hinge
precisely on the fact that it inevitably comes too late. Thus the famous litany of missed
opportunities: philosophy's failure to have sublated itself in practice (Negative Dia-
lectics), the bourgeoisie's inability to "find a successor" (P 273/260), the necrology of
art announced in the Aesthetic Theory. This guilty longevity - the flipside of Kantian
deferral- testifies precisely to an imperative all the more urgent for being announced
too late. "The resurrection of the dead would have to take place in the auto grave-
yards" (P 273/260).
Benjamin's Dilemma
In the notoriously hermetic preface to his Trauerspielbuch, Benjamin identifies the
regime of vision - Schau, Anschauung, the phenomenological projection of horizons-
as the acquitive or "possessive" operation of the subject seeking confirmation in what it
knows (I.1.215;OGT 35). Famously, truth is said to resist this. Non-intentional and non-
relational, truth, according to Benjamin's formula (which in this respect resembles that
of Levinas), "is not an unveiling [Enthullung] that destroys the mystery but a revelation
[Offenbarung] which does it justice" (I.1.211;OGT 31).5 It has become somewhat con-
ventional to read here a continuation and radicalization of a certain tendency within
both orthodox and heterodox Judaism towards an attenuation of any positive concept
of revelation: the rabbinic emphasis on aurality (the "voice from Sinai"), the kabbalistic
emphasis on the divine name. In short: the hermeneutic excess of interpretation over
meaning, and thus the demystification of every authoritative disclosure.
The predominance of language over vision, according to such a convention, would
suggest a certain privilege of Symbolic over Imaginary and thus the foreclosure of every
fantasy of fusion. Visualization invites identification and thus inevitably the spectre of
idolatrous confusion: the heterogeneity of the absolute requires a denunciation of
"beautiful appearance" [schone Schein] as the renunciation of the appropriative order
of the Same.
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Benjamin will speak, indeed, of sacrifice. Beauty is to be immolated - but simultane-
ously seeks "refuge" - on the "altar of truth" (I.1.211;OGT 31). The priority of "truth"
to "beauty" in this context (Hermann Cohen is never distant6 ) will elsewhere provoke
an extended invocation of a certain sublime (I.1.181): Kant, Novalis, the familiar "fable"
of the "veiled image" of Isis, whose unveiling is said to be fatal- shattering, even cas-
trating [zusammenbrechend] - for the inquirer (1.1.216;OGT 37).7
The prohibition at work here is by no means a simple one. If Benjamin will invoke a
traditional enough trope of truth-as-woman - inaccessible invisible inexpressible object
of an impossible desire - this is not to reinstate mystery cults under the rubric of icono-
clasm. That would be only to reduce the Bilderverbot to a simple esotericism - "some
enigmatic cruelty in actual meaning" (1.1.216;OGT 36) - and thus ultimately to reify the
lost object as simple positivity.
For the exposure of the truth here - the object neither "veiled" [verhiillt] nor "un-
veiled" [enthiillt] but rather the object itself in its "being-veiled" (1.1.195) - implies
simultaneously both a "surrender" (I.1.184) and an "escalation of appearance [Schein]
in a final and most extreme form" (1.1.186). The loss in representational or intentional
mediacy would involve a corresponding gain in "presentational" [darstellende] inten-
sity whereby what is relinquished is enhanced, and this according to the very measure
of its own negation. The very sacrifice of the aesthetic - Benjamin speaks in a related
context of Proust's "sacrifice" of character, plot, play of the imagination, and so on
(II.1.314;ILL 204) - would be accompanied and indeed counterbalanced by the expan-
sion of a certain "image sphere" [Bildraum] in which language itself, as it happens,
comes to the fore.
The very kernel of the dispute between Benjamin and Adorno lies just here. For
would not such a "sublime" sacrifice appear to involve a compensatory logic familiar
at least since Kant and Hegel: less is more, qui perd gagne, the slave logic of recupera-
tive self-denial? How to redeem such a sacrifice from the rationalist calculus identified
by Adorno and Horkheimer as the dialectic of Aufklarung - the mythic circle of renun-
ciation and reward? What will prevent Benjamin's version of the "saving of the phe-
nomena" from reverting into a simple legitimation of the existent?
This precisely will be Adorno's final question to Benjamin.
n. Before the Law
In breaking a statue one risks becoming a statue...
Jean Cocteau
How can a prohibition against images be enunciated? Is there not something pro-
foundly contradictory about the very representation of the law forbidding repre-
sentations of the absolute? Would not the law inevitably transgress itself in its own
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pronouncement? Would it not, indeed, stimulate the very iconophilia that it prohibits-
this according to the irreducible imbrication of law with desire, proscription with en-
joyment - and thus undermine itself in its very enunciation?
The issue here involves somewhat more than the double bind attendant on every
law in its self-universalizing force and promise. Hegel had already identified that ini-
tial problem, a logical one, in his chapter on "Force and the Understanding": this is
the paradox of a law rendered vacuous by its formal repeatability and hence binding
power. 8 It involves more, too, than the performative self-contradiction of a pronounce-
ment delegitimating itself precisely by virtue of its own legality. To pronounce the
Bilderverbot is itself to assume legislative authority - thus to identify with the origin of
the law, even if only in order to speak of it and on its behalf - in this sense committing
self-idolatry precisely in order to restrict or limit it, contaminating transcendence in the
very effort to protect its purity, assuming the essential guilt it would deter. Follow me!
do not follow me.... Is not the Bilderverbot in this respect the most self-transgressive of
all laws? Invoked in order to be violated - does it not indeed exemplify the ultimate
impossibility of the law as such? There is, however, more than one way of responding
to such an impossibility.
At issue here is not only the familiar psychoanalytic point (regarding the return of the
repressed as neurotic symptom), nor only the Foucaultian one (concerning the positive
productivity of the law in its very negativity). One might remark with equal cogency-
this will be my essential argument - that if every prohibition both incites and requires a
corresponding transgression, it is also conversely the case that through its apparent self-
infraction the law only binds us closer (although to what remains undetermined). In
this case the law's very inability to authorize itself may testify equally to an even deeper,
if perhaps ultimately inscrutable, prohibition - but perhaps equally to the claim of an
unspeakable desire.
Perhaps something more than dialectical reciprocity is at work in such a chiasmus
of law-and-transgression. Perhaps in this doubly contaminating movement of self-
deregulating regulation and self-regulating deregulation, another relationship both to
the law and to the image may begin to announce itself.
Ambiguity is the imagistic appearance of the dialectic, the law of the dialectic of the standstill
Benjamin
Since Kant, if not indeed since Longinus, it has become habitual to remark on the
"meta-sublime" nature of the very law announcing the essential incommensurability
between law and manifestation - the Second Commandment here taken to be not only
the paradigmatic statement about the sublime but the very paradigm of a "sublime
utterance"9 - suggesting the ultimate aporia of a law exemplifying itself precisely in
pronouncing the impossibility of every example. Thus the Biblical warning regarding
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every possible (inevitable) reification of the law. Moses' smashing and rewriting of the
tablets at Sinai expresses precisely the necessity of the second-degree iconoclasm neces-
sary to sustain the law by mitigating its eidetic self-evidence, thus marking its origins in
a prior event of self-erasure and hence its irreducible inscription within the domain of
history. The replacement set - no longer identified as "God's handiwork" (Exodus
32:16) but inexorably marked as substitute or simulacrum, writing rather than "engrav-
ing" - as such signifies the impossibility of any immediate relation to the original. This
announces the originary doubling of the law as the permanent imbrication of law and
interpretation. "It is from an already destroyed word that man learns the demand that
must speak to him."lo
But if the law thus incorporates its own infraction as the very condition of its own
articulation, it holds equally that every adherence is marked by a corresponding viola-
tion. The smashing of the tablets anticipates the pulverizing of the golden calf, which in
turn in its literalizing aggressivity only confirms the charismatic power of the idol. The
accusation of idolatry in this sense typically presupposes (as Hegel points out in his
analysis of Enlightenment's crusade against superstition) a "not very enlightened"l1
assumption regarding the relationship between finite being and the absolute, and for
this reason mystifies the very act of demystification as a "new serpent of wisdom raised
on high for adoration."12
And so on. The point is not simply a formal or logical one, nor is the issue quaintly
theological. It exposes a risk which affects every radical politics. For the very renuncia-
tion of images threatens precisely to determine the future as a tabula rasa or blank slate
receptive to the arbitrary projections of the present day. "Homogeneous empty time"
would be reinstated. The old "geometrical conception of the future" - Bataille's expres-
sion - would be re-established. Even setting aside the familiar paradoxes accompanying
the notion of a utopia determined essentially as the very absence of determination - the
conventional picture of a world without pictures - the danger of abstraction remains
ineluctable.
How to avoid a relapse into indeterminate negativity and thus immediacy? Does not
every Bilderverbot presuppose the familiar Platonic series of bifurcations - essence/
appearance, original/copy, truth/ideology - and hence a prolongation of the ascetic
ideal?
Much would seem to be at stake here.
Politically: how to resist reifying negativity itself as the very consolation which is
being denied?
Theologically: how to resist invoking negative theology as the symmetrical obverse of
dogmatic fundamentalism?
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We will not yet be able to name the law under which we stand
Benjamin, Gedanken uber Gerhart Hauptmanns Festspiel
There are, one might say, mythical and non-mythical articulations of the dilemma. That
is: the inevitable circle of law-and-transgression can be entered in a variety of fashions.
If, to introduce Benjamin's terms, the regime of fate is defined by the compulsive circle
of guilt-retribution-guilt which turns the "guilt context of the living" (U.138) into the
nightmare of a "never ending trial" (11.2.412;1LL 114) - from the tragic cycles of Greek
drama to the protracted vertigo of Kafka's Prozess - such a regime also harbours an
essential "ambiguity" [Zweideutigkeit] (II.1.199;R 296) which may conceal unexpected
resources.
According to the terms of the "Critique of Violence," the mythical origin of the law
(ef II.1.154;R 328) suggests "the ultimate undecidability of all legal problems" (II.l.l96;
R 293) and eventually points to the inability of the law itself to determine practice.
Thus Kafka's "new attorney" no longer practises but only "studies" law (II.2.437;ILL
139) - an impasse which will eventually receive its starkest formulation in Kafka's
notion of a trial in which guilt is perpetuated even or especially in every effort at
self-exculpation, as indeed in the very judgment which would delimit or contain it.
"Does it not turn the judge into the defendant?" (II.2.427;1LL 128f) If this suggests (to
Scholem's unease)13 a final indeterminacy regarding the status of the law in its "purest"
or most paradigmatic form as a Last Judgment (now indefinitely protracted and hence
de-finalized owing to its complicity with its object), perhaps no firm distinction can be
sustained (at least by way of any tribunal of judgement or "critical" discrimination)
between the mythic cycle of retribution and the divine justice which would "only expi-
ate" (1L1.199;R 297).
Adorno has rehearsed the problem with irritating rigour. The inescapable imbrication
of myth and enlightenment implies the persistence of superstition in the very taboo
which would eliminate it and as such the inevitable relapse of every demythologization
into yet another demonology. The blank purity of a world from which idols have been
eliminated not only "assumes the numinous character" of a reality still governed by
fear and trembling (DA 45;DE 28), but moreover represses the mimetic impulse without
which happiness as such - the very possibility of reconciliation - remains unthinkable.
Thus the inevitable inscription of the law forbidding representation within the logic of
self-preservation (Exodus 33:20: "No man may see me and live."). Absence itself can in
this sense become a defence or fetish. "The destruction of illusion does not produce truth
but only one more piece of ignorance, an extension of our 'empty space,' an increase of
our desert" (Nietzsche).14
Every move from here can be predicted. Every abstract or undialectical Bilderver-
bot both assumes and stimulates prudish fantasies of purity which only serve to rein-
force the mystification under contestation while providing the familiar comforts of
self-mortification. The mistakes of others are, as usual, for Adorno, instructive. From
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Kierkegaard to, yes, finally, Schonberg, a slavish adherence to the law satisfies a prig-
gish need for punishment while releasing a stream of phantasmagorical productions,
Thus Adorno's infamous diagnoses. Kierkegaard's longing for "imageless presence"
expresses the (class-based) asceticism which would - in its eagerness to repudiate every
finite semblance obstructing the "infinite good of happiness" - only reinscribe the lat-
ter within a sacrificial calculus of "goods" or acquisitions, and would in this way mis-
take the "emptiness of the concept" for the desired gratification (K 190ffl134ff). Veblen's
desire for a clean slate is found to be a variation on this. The "splendidly misanthropic"
invective against the regime of kitsch or spectacle (P 77/79) presupposes as the price of
its insight a Platonizing blindness with respect to the world of "deceptive appearances":
this only reproduces the puritanical fantasy of a fresh start regulated by the bourgeois
"idol" of production (P 83/83). Ditto (mutatis mutandis) the curmudgeonly abjection-
resentful, crypto-Christian - of a Huxley. "His anger at false happiness sacrifices the
idea of true happiness as well" (P 1051103). Not even Adorno's Schonberg in the end
will be exempted. Schonberg's "entanglement in the aporia of false transition" (P 170/
164) will symptomatically betray itself, in Moses and Aaron, in a neo-Wagnerian monu-
mentalism which will eventually elide the caesura between myth and monotheism and
thus undermine the opera's own iconoclastic momentum: "Moses and the Dance around
the Golden Calf speak a single language" (QF 241).
And so on. It's not my interest here either to reprimand Adorno for his unkindness or
to rehearse the familiar litany of counter-accusations regarding Adorno's own malinger-
ings in the "grand hotel abyss" of abstract negation. If there's something painfully self-
revealing about Adorno's portrait of the raging penitent rubbing himself raw against
the prison-bars of self-denial, the point is less to procure from Adorno a corresponding
auto-critique (such confessions are not hard to extract, and tend in any case to neutral-
ize themselves) than to consider the specific demand here placed on thought. Adorno
himself formulates the dilemma with precision:
How is potentiality to be conceived if it is not to be absract and arbitrary, like the
utopias dialectical philosophers proscribed? Conversely, how can the next step
assume direction and aim without the subject knowing more than what is already
given? If one chose to reformulate Kant's question, one could ask today: how is any-
thing new possible at all? (P 95/93)
It is around just this point that relations between Adorno and Benjamin will eventually
become a little tense.
Adorno will finally force the question on Benjamin. Will Benjamin's version of
Messianism evade the dilemma here presented as being quite irresistable? Will the
dialectical image ultimately escape the antithesis between abstract negativity and the
idolatry of the given? The question will also in the end be Horkheimer's. Does Ben-
jamin's "atheological theology" overcome the antinomy between positivism and other-
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worldliness? Is every image of the past condemned to confirm the present precisely by
insisting on the possibility of redemption?
Both Adorno and Horkheimer will finally charge Benjamin with utopianism. Hork-
heimer convicts Benjamin of "idealism": to form a dialectical image of the past is to
occlude its "closure" - "the slain are really slain" - and thus to smuggle in some kind
of eschatological horizon of consolation (II.3.1332f). Adorno, as we will see, charges
positivism: to form any image of the future is inevitably to reify the present and thus
to garnish the status quo with its ultimate apologia. Each will therefore come to diag-
nose Benjamin's problem as that of "insufficient dialectics." Too much theology on the
one hand, not enough on the other: the symmetrical accusations typify what will
indeed soon enough become the standard chorus of reproaches. "Janus-faced," "two
tracked,"15 Benjamin's project will be found to fall "between two stools"16 - a graft as
awkward as the stitching of a "monk's cowl" onto the withered body of historical
materialism.17
Ill. Illusion of a Future
A prophet facing backwards
Friedrich SchlegeI
An early text of Benjamin's presents the problem "figuratively" [in einem Bilde]
(II.1.203; R 312). If the disjunction between theology and materialism implies simulta-
neously a reciprocity, this means, at once, both a foreclosure of every progressivist, sec-
ular eschatology and a vindication of its deepest claims. "Nothing historical can relate
itself on its own to anything Messianic." Such a notion relates not only to the apocalyp-
tic mystical strand of Judaism (as glossed by Scholem), but equally (something often
overlooked by Benjamin's readers) to a certain rationalist tradition running from the
Babylonian Talmud through Maimonides and beyond. 18 This means that a cataclysmic
rupture divides the profane order of history (olam hazeh) from the kingdom of God
(olam haba).
"From the standpoint of history," the Kingdom of God - redemption - "is not the
goal [Ziel], but the end [Ende]" (II.1.203;R 312). Every teleological determination of
history reduces to a narrowly instrumentalist or reformist series of improvements and
adjustments - the opposition between a Lenin and a Bernstein in this sense immediately
collapses - only sanctioning the hegemony of the present day.
Thus the familiar catalogue of renunciations - the historian as the prophet facing
backward (Schlegel), the modern Orpheus who now stands to re-lose his Eurydice by
looking ahead (Jean Paul). "Accursed is the rider who is chained to his nag because he
has set himself a goal for the future" (Kafka's bucket-rider) (II.2.436;ILL 138). The
angel of history catches not even a glimpse of the future to which his back is turned
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(1.2.697f;ILL 257). The "destructive character" who "clears away" without a construc-
tive "vision" of the future leaves "for a moment, at least, empty space [leere Raum] in
which 'ways' or 'crossroads' might open up" (1Y.1.397f;R 301£). No image, similarly,
inspires the revolutionary: neither "the ideal of liberated grandchildren" nor the utopia
"painted in the heads" of the Social Democrats (1.2.700;ILL 260). The long view of his-
toricist prognostication must thus contract to the lightning flash of historical material-
ist intervention.
Benjamin explicitly links such a renunciation to the iconoclastic imperative of
Judaism: "we know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future"
(1.2.704;ILL 264). The messianic moment- "Messianic power" in the "weak" sense
(1.2.694;ILL 254) - remains as inscrutable as ultraviolet rays. "Whoever wants to know
how a 'redeemed humanity' would be constituted, under what conditions it would be
constituted, and when one can count on it, poses questions to which there is no answer.
He might as well ask about the colour of ultraviolet rays" (1.3.1232).
Kant Avec Marx
The image (yes) presented by Benjamin's first thesis on history indicates the complexity
of the issue. Whatever the nature of the entanglement between "theological" dwarf and
"historical materialist" puppet - collusion, codependence, unsublatable contradiction-
the figure itself invokes the very spectre of idolatry if only in order to demystify it. The
automaton is in any case considerably less automatic than the animated images of Dae-
dalus. To celebrate the unfettered progress of the "apparatus" - Social Democracy,
from one side, Stalinism, from the other - is in itself to fall prey to the transcendental
illusion which would hypostatize the absolute as already there.
Kant and Marx awkwardly join forces. The error of utopian socialism would be pre-
cisely to blur the critical border between the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of
freedom" - the vocabularies of Kant and Marx curiously coincide here - thereby conta-
minating the very ideal of communism with the empirical categories of the present day.
Every effort to write "recipes for the cookshops of the future"19 is guilty of this. Hegel
saw this clearly in the preface to the Philosophy of Right when he rejected the popular
demand to "give instruction" [Belehren] - to construct the world "as it ought to be"20
- as presupposing an undialectical collapse of the critical gap between Sein and Sollen,
constative and performative, thus introducing the spectre of unmediated abstraction.
For Marx such a collapse marked the secret complicity between ideology and utopia.
The "chimerical game" of painting "fancy pictures of the future structure of society"21
could only whitewash the existent precisely by "leaving out the shadows."22 For Kant
such a collapse would introduce the illegitimate miscegenation of a theoretical nou-
menology. To the "magic lantern of phantoms" projected by natural theology23 would
correspond the commandeering gaze which would "behold" or "prove"24 what should
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remain properly conjectural. Presumptive insight [Einsichtsfahigkeit] would thereby
usurp the place of the "weak glimpse" [schwache Blick] of reason.25 The reduction of
the law (freedom) to the conditions of phenomenality could only reduce action to
the "lifeless" gesticulations of a "puppet" governed by fear and trembling. Hyper-
trophic enlightenment would in this way come to signify nothing but the tutelage of a
mortified nature.
In either case the result is fetishism: to depict redemption as a logical extension of the
present is effectively to confuse potentiality with facticity, freedom with necessity, and
thus only to confirm one's own immersion in the imaginary. Every "ideal of liberated
grandchildren"26 cannot fail, in this sense, to function ideologically. The very faith in a
better future secretly sanctifies the given by offering placating pictures which would
only distract the viewer from the most urgent imperatives of the day. To honour the
false god of progress is precisely to fall victim to the "system of mirrors" creating the
optical illusion of "transparency," Enlightenment, or clear sight. If theology today "has
to keep out of sight" (dwarfish, "small and ugly") (I.2.693;ILL 253), this is ultimately
because its promise contains the still unredeemed possibility of a happiness unrepre-
sentable within the perspective of the present day.
Everything Benjamin writes, from the earliest exhortations to the youth movement
through to the final "Theses on the Philosophy of History" - thus the entire uneasy tra-
jectory from hyperidealism to Messianism - will reiterate this basic point.
The Kantian commitments of the early writings establish the essential problematic. If
the task of "youth" is to keep open the critical "abyss" [Kluft] (11.1.31) between the
absolute and the apparent, any premature sighting of the Idea is tantamount to the
"deadly sin" (11.1.32) of naturalizing Geist by hypostatizing its incarnation as already
or even foreseeably accomplished. This would be the theological hubris of the "great
seer" [der gro{5e Schauender] (11.1.32). Benjamin will target under an identical censure
the otherwise contradictory conciliations proposed, variously, by German classicism, by
the Wandervogel, and by the instrumentalism haunting Weimar, from the academic
Berufsgeist to the progressivist optimism of Der Anfang - each of which will be con-
victed of a veritable "idolatry of Geist" (111.1.320) in its sterile affirmation of the exis-
tent. Nietzsche had already identified the modern military state as the newest idol: a
"horse of death" masquerading in the name of life itself, and thereby "clattering in the
finery of divine honors."27 Thus, for the young Benjamin (already traumatized from the
outset), the degradation of the Idea into the "spirit of 1914" and the harnessing of the
youth movement to the patriotic ratification of the status quo.
A certain optical conceit would indeed seem from beginning to end to mark the
ideology of "life" as that which prolongs by dissimulating the mortified condition of
a fallen nature. Every gaze into the "blue distance" (11.2.620) - from the Romantic
Fernsicht to the schauendes Bewu{5tsein of a lung or Klages - would placate the viewer
with the consolation of unattainable ideals all the more enticing for being eternal and
thus present in their very absence.
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Was not such an illusionistic distance precisely the "urbanistic ideal" (Y.S6;CB 173)
of the Second Empire?28 Haussmann's boulevards would entice the spectator with the
long perspectival vistas promising an infinitely deferred gratification (while at the same
time effectively forestalling insurrection by preventing the building of barricades). The
Eiffel Tower would offer a secure vantage point from which the spectactor could
admire his progress, reiterating the general point underlying the architecture of all the
nineteenth-century world expositions ("modern festivals" [Y.267] enabling the workers
to gape at the very machinery which was rendering them superfluous), thereby confirm-
ing the Saint-Simonian "fairy-tale" that progres is the prospect of the very near future
(Y.716). The glass architecture of the arcades would foster the illusion of the outside on
the inside, promising a visual exteriority while in fact reinforcing the immanence of the
exterior (meanwhile new technologies of artificial lighting would be turning the street
itself into a domestic interieur29 ), and would in this way mollify the demand for tran-
scendence by providing the gratification of a good view. The crowds making their daily
"pilgrimage" (Y.86) to these "enchanted grottoes" (Y.I04S) of consumerism would en-
joy the spectacle of goods whose very appearance of availability only underscores the
scopophilic regime of private property - "look, don't touch" (Y.267) - while the peep-
show panoramas were to provide the visual sensation of a progressive movement
securely contained and oriented within the private confines of a box.
It is no coincidence that the cruciform structure of the arcades will be observed by
Benjamin to resemble church architecture (V.I0S). If the arcades are seen to preserve
perspectival space with the same tenacity as cathedrals (Y.I049), this is ultimately
because the phantasmagoria of progress here would involve nothing less than a general-
ized fantasy of resurrection. Dead things promise to come alive within these enchanted
"temples" (V.86). Vision would seek to confirm itself through the specular return of a
gaze emanating from a universe packaged as merchandise, whose inviting glances exem-
plify the "theological caprices" of which Marx speaks. Thus Benjamin's re-articulation
of the classic chapter on commodity fetishism: "things" acquire speech, glance, person-
ality - the anthropomorphic features stripped from a by now thoroughly reified
humanity-in a chiastic transfer whereby the transfer of "life" as such passes essen-
tially by way of the eyes. Hence the multiplication of optical devices designed to prop
up the subject's faltering sense of sight. "The opticians' shops were besieged..." (Y.830f).
The phantasmagoric gaze of the object becomes one more prosthetic extension designed
to confirm the eidetic powers of the subject30 whose own ocular anxieties meanwhile
betray themselves in obsessive fantasies of an uncanny non-reciprocity and non-simul-
taneity, as in Baudelaire's images of jewel-eyed statues, blank-eyed prostitutes, eyes
gleaming as vacantly as mirrors (Y.I049) or as shop windows - "tes yeux illumines
ainsi que des boutiques" (I.2.649;CB ISO). "]ugendstil sees in every woman not Helena
but Olympia ..." (Y.694).
Vision would falsely promise here to fulfil the ego's fantasy of an im!llanence which
would elide the temporal gap or non-identity at work in all experience. This is the ideo-
Rebecca Coma)' 67
logical aspect of the idealist "apotheosis of existence" (1.1.337;OGT 160), exemplified
by Weimar classicism and theorized as the reconciliation of finite and infinite in the
visual plasticity of the symbol- interpreted, as always, Hegelian-wise31 - as the "sensu-
ous embodiment of the idea" (1.1.341;OGT 164). If such an incarnation of the noumenal
involves a spiritual animation of nature and specifically the latter's self-representation,
delimitation and perfection in the human - henceforth securely installed [eingestellt]
along the sacral course of Heilsgeschichte (1.1.337;OGT 160) - such a logic of substi-
tution [Stellvertretung] (1.1.341;OGT 165) involves a fundamental distortion [Entstel-
lung] (I.1.337;OGT 160) underwritten by a politics of "domination" and "usurpation"
(1.1.336;OGT 159) whereby not only allegorical distance is occluded but with it the rad-
ical transience and suffering of a finite nature (1.1.343;OGT 166).
Such an occlusion would severely restrict the potential space of every action. In its
"seamless transition" from phenomenal to noumenal (the "limitless immanence of
the ethical world in the world of beauty"), the humanist apotheosis of the perfected
individual would constrict the "radius of action" to a mere "radius of culture" [Bil-
dungsradius] (1.1.337;OGT 160), would miscontrue particularity [das Einzelne] (1.1.343;
OGT 166) as abstract inwardness or individuality [Individuum] (1.1.337;OGT 160)-
would, in short, condemn the ethical subject to the "unmanly" posturings of the beau-
tiful soul. The beautiful images or "constructions" [Gebilde] of the symbolic would
efface the (Kantian) "abyss" [Abgrund] dividing "visual being [bildliche Sein] from
meaning" (1.1.342;OGT 165) - phenomenon from noumenon - and would thereby
erase the "jagged line of demarcation" which etches the traits of nature's untrans-
figured countenance as "untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful" (1.1.343;OGT 166): the line
of death.
In such a consoling vision of a transfigured nature, the "enigmatic question" [Riit-
selfrage] is suppressed regarding human existence in its (historic) specificity as tied inex-
orably to a fallen, transient nature (1.1.343;OGT 166). Such occlusion will ultimately
define the barbarism underwriting every "document of civilization" (1.2.696;ILL 256)-
the secret link between humanism and militarism, "the unity between Weimar and
Sedan" (II1.1.258). The seven-headed hydra of the Geisteswissenschaften ("creativity,
empathy, timelessness, re-creation, Miterleben," etc.), with its vitalist identifications and
its "lecherous urge for the big picture" (II1.1.286) - historicism's" bordello" (1.2.702;
ILL 262) - would institutionalize itself in the "sacred groves" of "timeless poets"
(II1.1.289) and "eternal values" (III.1.286), in a fanatic "exorcism of history" (III.1.289)
which would entrench the hegemony of "Western man" under the cover of a universal-
ity posited as already there. It is in this sense that classicism is said to culminate in the
"Germanic soteriology" (II1.1.254) whose "'Rettung'" (II1.1.257) (Benjamin's scare-
quotes) of the dead as Vorbilder (II1.1.255) - objects of empathic identification - adds
up to the sauve qui peut of a triumphant nationalism. This would occlude the persis-
tence of inherited power relations through an appeal to the presumed continuities of
race or caste.
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It is no coincidence here that such a soteriology is said to be orchestrated by "seers
whose visions appear over dead bodies" (III.259). This is the empathic gaze which
would find spiritual return in a past reanimated as ancestral prototype or precursor-
so too equally Benjamin's eventual definition of aura as the inanimate object's ability to
return the gaze32 - an idealizing revival of the dead which inevitably accrues to the
profit of the survivors in their triumphal march through the continuum of time.
IV. Bilderflucht: Critical Resuscitations
Re(sus)citations
This is not to exclude the possibility of another gaze, another resurrection. In the face
of the "blooming, blazing vision" [blumenhaft flammende Blick] of neo-classicist
revival, Benjamin opposes the (yes, still fertile) gaze of a theoria which would again
summon back the dead - not, this time, for adulation, but for interrogation.
We must stand... by the inconspicuous [unansehnlichen] truth, the laconism of
the seed, of fruitfulness, and thus of theory, which leaves behind the spell of vision
[Schau]. If there are timeless images, there are certainly no timeless theories. Not
tradition, but only originality [Ursprunglichkeit], can decide this. The genuine
image may be old, but the genuine thought is new. It is of today. This today may
be derelict, granted. But be that as it may, one must seize it firmly by the horns, if
one is to be able to pose questions of the past. It is the bull whose blood must fill
the pit, if the spirits of the departed are to appear [erscheinen] at its edge. (IIl.1.259)
What exactly is the distinction introduced here between "vision" and "theory"? A tem-
poral one, to begin with. Whatever the apparent continuities between flower and seed,
between "image" and "appearance," there is (to be) a fundamental opposition between
mythic violence, which would efface time by occluding the position of the present
(thereby surreptitiously securing it), and the sacrifice which would vindicate the present
precisely by exposing the latter's vulnerability and responsibility to - its "secret rendez-
vous" with (I.2.694;ILL 254) - the past. 33
On this distinction rests the difference between "tradition" and "originality." The
former, we might gloss, aims at re-sur-rection: the spiritual transfiguration, exaltation,
and uplifting of the dead as "cultural treasures" (I.2.696;ILL 256) within the homoge-
neous continuum of mythic time. The latter aims at re-sus-citation: the sollicitation or
summoning of the dead as Abhub or unsublatable remainder within the fractured dis-
continuum of a history brought to a caesura or Messianic standstill. The measure of
"originality" is thus not the abstractness of a new beginning staked out within the his-
toricist "stream of becoming" (I.1.226;OGT 45). It will express itself rather according
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to the diphasic "rhythm" of a finite repetition whereby the past is restored or cited as
radically "imperfect" and "incomplete" (cf I.1.226;OGT 45).
Vision" thus sees a face: the specular return-to-self of the viewing subject as it narcis-
sistically constructs itself through the consoling tete-a-tete with the beautified or trans-
figured other. "Theory" sees a mask: the stain of the death's head whose vacant stare
marks the radical alterity or non-coincidence of viewer and viewed, look and gaze (the
Lacanian framework would seem here indispensable),34 and as such the annihilation or
traumatic wounding of the self-conscious subject hostage to the claim of an immemor-
ial past. Such non-coincidence marks the scene of history as facies hippocratica, non-
recuperable alterity, the one-way street of irredeemable transience and suffering.35 "It is
as something incomplete and imperfect that objects stare out [starren] from the allegor-
ical structure" (I.1.362;OGT 186).
Symbolic resurrection - "vision" - thus calls up the dead as object of consumption:
the mourned object devoured or introjected as host or food for thought.
Allegorical resuscitation - "theory" - throws up the dead as indigestible remainder and
untimely reminder, the persistent demand of unsublimated matter. Thus the appearance
of the returning spirits as vampires feeding at the present's trough.
Resurrection, as we read in the essay on Leskov, is in this sense to be conceived less
as an idealizing transfiguration than as a radical disenchantment [Entzauberung]:
humanity's liberation from the "nightmare" of mythic immanence (II.2.458;ILL 102£).
Such a demystification cannot assume a (mythic) opposition between myth and enlight-
enment. The operative distinction would seem to work rather within the interstices of
myth itself, at the point where myth points towards its own exterior or buried entrails.
These are the little "tricks" folded into the apparently seamless fabric of mythic iden-
tity - the "liberating magic" of the fairy-tale's reassuring happy ending - Kafka's "proof
that inadequate, even childish measures may serve to rescue one" (II.2.415;ILL 117).
Theatres of Redemption
The only break from the spell of the imaginary is thus by way of a thoroughgoing
immersion. If (as Adorno has insisted) every abstract foreclosure of images elicits a hal-
lucinatory return (as symptom or delirium), it is perhaps conversely the case (this is
now what we must consider) that a certain intensification of images may open a breach
or rupture within the seamless continuum of mythic immanence, and thus indeed point
precisely to the imminence of what is radically unforeseen. To wit: the apparent viola-
tion of the Bilderverbot may indeed attest to its most productive power.
Iconophilia itself (or its appearance) may indeed thus come to assume iconoclastic
proportions. Writing of the Baroque extravaganza - the folie du VOil·36 of a culture out-
doing "even the Egyptians" (I.1.350;OGT 174) in effects of spectacularity-Benjamin
perceives in the "eruption of images" of the stage-world a style nothing short of "sub-
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lime" (1.1.349; OGT 173). The allegorical detachment of appearance from signification
- the "abyss separating visual being from meaning" (I.1.342;OGT 165) - intensifies
ocular possibilities so as to heighten the eschatological tension between immanence and
transcendence, thereby "securing for the latter the greatest conceivable rigour, exclusiv-
ity, and relentlessness" (L1.359;OGT 183). It is indeed the very profusion of images
which will here block any fantasy of premature reconciliation.
If it is part of the very logic of modernity to convert every prohibition of images into
yet another image of prohibition - thus the dazzle of negative signposts cluttering the
urban landscape of One-Way Street ("Post no bills!," "Caution: Steps!," "No Vagrants!,"
"Protect these Plantings!") - it will take "heroic" (d L2.577;CB 74) measures to negoti-
ate the aporia of such a specularity without term.
One- Way Street presents the by now familiar aporia vividly. Here the "imperial
panorama" of progress is seen only to prolong the claustrophobia of the interior. Thus
the vista of a "glorious cultural future" as ultimate domestic phantasm: a consoling
"mirage" projected against the "folds of dark drapery" which mask and reinforce the
confinement of the present day (IV.1.98;OWS 58). Not even the most sublime land-
marks would remain intact. Mountaintops are shrouded. "A heavy curtain shuts off
Germany's sky" (IV.1.99;OWS 58). It would be clearly no escape here to appeal to the
presumed neutrality of a "critical standpoint," "prospect" or "perspective" (IV.1.132;
OWS 89). Such a perspective could only smuggle in the optical illusion of the pano-
rama, would intensify the phantasmagoria in the very effort to see through it, would
therefore reinforce immanence precisely in the claim to externality or transcendence.
This is the nightmare of total theater - Proust's aquarium,37 if not indeed Aragon's38-
the no-exit or "dead end" (as One- Way Street was originally baptised) of our spectacu-
lar modernity:
It is as though one were trapped in a theatre and had to follow the events on stage
whether one wanted to or not, had to make them again and again, willingly or
unwillingly, the subject of one's thought and speech. (IV.1.98jOW5 57)
The "way out" here can be figured, indeed properly staged, only as a dramatic pause
within the phantasmagoria of total vision. If every premature attempt to quit the circle
secretly prolongs what it would abandon (cf IY.1.85f;OWS 46), any rupture will require
a certain collaboration with mythic forces and will thus assume an infinitely ambiguous
guise. "Costume Wardrobe" presents the scene of redemption as nothing more and
nothing less than a theatrical occurrence:
Again and again, in Shakespeare, in Calderon, battles fill the act, and kings, princes,
attendants and followers "enter, fleeing." The moment [Augenblick] in which they
become visible to spectators brings them to a standstill. The flight of the dramatis
personae is arrested by the stage. Their entry into the visual field [Blickraum] of
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non-participating and truly impartial persons allows the harassed to draw breath,
bathes them in new air. The appearance on stage of those who enter "fleeing" takes
from this its hidden meaning. Our reading of this formula is imbued with expecta-
tion of a place, a light, a footlight glare [Rampenlicht], in which our own flight
through life may be likewise sheltered in the presence of onlooking strangers.
(IV.1.143;OWS 100)
Redemption - breath, here, as always - is thus figured within the Blickraum or Bild-
raum of consummated visibility. The decentering of the gaze (the transformation of
reader from spectator to potential spectacle) is here presented as a reversal without
empathic reciprocity or symmetry. A Brechtian distance characterizes the position both
of viewing subject and of object viewed.
This is the "cunning" (Y.1213) - "teleological" -whereby the dream, intensifying
itself, pushes forward towards its own awakening.
There will, then, "still be a sphere of images [Bildraum], and, more concretely" - for
this very reason - "of bodies [Leibraum]" (II.1.309jR 192). If the modern epoch, despite
or because of its hypertrophic specularity, represents the ultimate laming or maiming of
the imagination (I.2.611jILL 159), it is the image alone which will come to redeem a
body and a body politic fractured irreparably by the force of time. The expulsion of
"moral metaphor from politics" (II.1.309jR 191) - the elimination of the social-democ-
ratic gradus ad parnassum (1I.1.308jR 190) - requires precisely the "opening" or elabo-
ration of a competing image sphere through which alone the body reconfigures itself in
time.
This is not the project of aesthetic Bildung. In this version of a materialist last judge-
ment, the suffering body submits to a "dialectical justice" (Benjamin's rewriting of the
Hegelian Bacchanalian revel) according to which "no member remains unrent [unzeris-
sen]" (1I.1.309jR 192). The reconstitution of a new physis (II.1.310jR 192) or "new
body" (IY.1.148jOWS 104) for the corporeal collective [leibliche Kollektivum] (11.3.
1041) involves the shattering of every fantasy of aesthetic harmony or immanence.
If Benjamin here announces the onset of a veritable "slave revolt of technology" (111.1.
238), this is not to be confused with the ascetic consolation which would (as in futur-
ism) vitalistically sublate or aestheticize the mortified conditions of a damaged life. This
is therefore not the resurrection of a body or a body politic spiritualized within the eter-
nal community of mankind. If it is a fissured, epileptic (IY.1.148jOWS 104) body which
is to enter the final court of judgement, this is precisely so as to repel every mythic soli-
darity suggested by the "idol" of a "harmoniously and perfectly formed humanity"-
the "phantom of the unpolitical or 'natural' man" (1I.1.364jR 270). "The subject of his-
tory: not mankind [die Menschheit] but the oppressed" (I.3.1244). To "work at impor-
tant locations in the sphere of images" is precisely to protect the revolutionary impulse
from degenerating into a "bad poem on springtime" (1I.1.309jR 191): this is the "orga-
nization of pessimism" of which Benjamin writes.
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It could indeed be argued that Benjamin's familiar series of salvage operations
(romanticism, surrealism, Proust, Baudelaire, Brecht, Kafka, film, photography, and so
on) will be directed precisely towards that kernel in the imaginary which defies ideal-
ization, and which thus negotiates an opening to the unforeseen. The Biblical Bilder-
verbot is thus refunctioned as a Bilderflucht (VA10): a flight from the mythical image to
the dialectical image divested of all consoling force. Benjamin's "dialectical optic" will
pit image against image.
Whatever else may be at work in brushing cultural history against the grain of his-
toricist (self)-misunderstanding - Goethe against Gundolf, Romanticism against Sturm
und Drang, Kafka against Brod, cinema against Riefenstahl, Mickey Mouse against
Disney, surrealism against the musty "spiritualism" which would collapse the visionary
impulse into the occultism of mystagogues and mediums (II.1.298;R 180) - whatever the
force and legitimacy of Benjamin's specific rewritings, it will in each case be a question
of a retrieval rather than a repression of ocular possibilities, and as such the vindication
of a imaginary burdened by the essential "ambiguity" that announces the very "law" of
the refurbished dialectic (V.55;CB 171).
If it is within the world-theatre that Kafka's "hope for the hopeless" is to be realized
(II.2.415;ILL 100) - fake sky, paper wings: Adorno will indeed come to suspect this
(1I.3.1177f) - this is precisely because the only "way out" (as in the Report to an
Academy) is by recapturing the last vestige of a repressed mimetic impulse (II.2.423;ILL
125). "The mimetic and the critical faculties can no longer be distinguished" (11.3.
1050). If Proust's frenetic search for images will involve the "vice" ("one is tempted to
say, theological") of obsequious curiosity,39 this will indeed come to imply the inevitable
enmeshment of every image of redemption within the "enchanted forest" [Bannwald]
(11.1.313;ILL 204) of mythic guilt.
All of which will lead soon enough to the predictable charges: bewitchment, coopta-
tion, identification with the aggressor.
V. Bilderstreit: Adorno Contra Benjamin
Mosaics
It is with the abortive Passagenwerk - "the theatre of all my conflicts and all my ideas"
(Br S06;C 359) - that the issues first come to a head. Benjamin will be observed playing
sorcerer's apprentice, mesmerized by what he would subvert. Specifically: if it is the
ocular regime of modernity which presents the face of history as sheer monstrosity-
not only an "oversized head" (Y.10ll) but indeed (as Marx also observed40 ) a "Medusa
head" (1.2.682) - Benjamin will be found petrified by what he sees.
By 1935 Adorno will indeed accuse him of capitulating to the force of capital. Pano-
ramatic representations of the panorama, kaleidodoscopic representations of the kalei-
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doscope - the montage technique is here found not only to mime that of surrealism,
but effectively to adopt what will be for Adorno the latter's irremediably conciliatory
position. A cryptic affirmation, Behauptung, would be detected in the physiognomic
determination of Paris as Hauptstadt der neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, head or capital of
the nineteenth century (a title "privately" translated into French by Benjamin41 and
eventually discarded), which would be thus transfigured as nothing less than the pro-
scribed figure of utopia. Paris, decapitated site of missed revolutionary opportuni-
ties,42 would be reinstated to centre stage so as indeed to provide the alluring scene or
spectacle of redemption. Caput mortuum would be thus figured or transfigured as, pre-
cisely, face.
It is not simply that Benjamin will aggressively rely on images to tell a story (cf
Y.596); nor just that what begins as an "album" (Y.1324) will soon collapse under its
own weight into a "rubble field" (Br 556;C 396) of Bouvard-and-Pecuchet-esque pro-
portions; nor even that the specific images to be culled here - the familiar shopping list:
arcades, ragpickers, balconies, and the rest - will for Adorno bear an irredeemably con-
sumerist stamp.
Nor is it only (although this is not irrelevant) a question of the respective commit-
ments of Adorno and Benjamin as cultural critics - high culture vs. mass culture, music
vs. photography, aural vs. visual, and all the rest. If Adorno's complaint will come
eventually to crystallize in the notorious assault on film culture as mass hypnosis, it is
perhaps less the specific example of the medium which is significant here than the
actual logic underlying the attack. If Benjamin will be rebuked, following his artwork
essay, for the "romantic anarchism" (1.3.1003) which would hypostatize the "actually
existing consciousness of actually existing workers" (1.3.1005) and thereby pre-empt
revolution precisely by prefiguring it - the charge essentially reproduces Lenin's re-
proach to Luxembourg - it is important to consider the specific assumptions here at
work. Underpinning what will be an otherwise conventional jeremiad linking media
culture to mass idolatry (from Baudelaire's 1859 Salon43 to ]acques Ellul) is a con-
frontation over the nature of memory and the specific temporality of the historical
imagination.
The very conception of the dialectical image is here at stake. Benjamin's "stereo-
scopic" (cf Y.571) glance into the untimely constellation of an unrealized past and a
regressive present will be condemned as doubly affirmative insofar as it would symmet-
rically entrench both, according to Adorno, within a shared horizon of conciliation. In
short: any image of a "redeemed humanity" glimpsed from within the phantasmagoric
dream sleep of modernity could only transgress the Bilderverbot and thereby inevitably
recycle ideology as utopia.
Benjamin's citation of Michelet ("Avenir! Avenir!") is here decisive: "Chaque epoque
reve la suivante" (V.46;CB 159). Benjamin reads here the crucial ambiguity of every
image - the "law of dialectic at a standstill" (V.55;CB 171) - the intertwining of regres-
sion and utopia visibly at work in every time. "In the dream in which every epoch sees
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in images the epoch which is to succeed it, the latter appears coupled with elements of
prehistory - that is to say, of a classless society" (V.46;CB 159). Adorno reads in such a
coupling the monstrous complicity of nostalgia and otherworldliness. Klages married to
Fourier: a "linear" relationship to the future spun from the cocoon of collective con-
sciousness, a hallucinatory wish fulfilment destined only to accomodate the present by
posing undialectically as the truth (Br 672;C 495). In short: in succumbing to the "spell
of bourgeois psychology" (Br 674;C 497) Benjamin will not only divert psychoanalysis
along Jungian lines but indeed disregard Freud's emphatic denial of all prophetic signif-
icance to the work of dream.44 "Every epoch not only dreams the next" but in so doing
presses "dialectically" (Y.59;CB 176) and with "cunning" (V.1213) towards its own
awakening. This is Benjamin's Proustian refunctioning of Hegel's List der Vernunft: the
"Trojan horse" (V.495) installed within the dream sleep of nineteenth-century mass cul-
ture. Adorno, perhaps the better Freudian here, would see the essential purpose of the
dream to prolong our dogmatic slumbers, and thus reads Benjamin as apologist of con-
tinuity or consummated "immanence" (Br 672£;C 495£). The dialectical image would in
this way forfeit its "objective liberating power" and so resign itself to the sterile repro-
duction of das Ndchste.
Adorno will be neither the first nor the last to accuse Benjamin of idolatry. By 1938,
the montage-effect will represent the ultimate disintegration of the Mosaic imperative
into the concatenations of sheer mosaic - a "superstitious enumeration of materials"
(Br 787;C 583) which in its "ascetic" abstention from conceptual elaboration would
"demonically" (Br 783;C 580) restrict itself to a pious "incantation" [Beschworung] of
the bare facts (Br 786;C 582).
The status of "theory" as such is on the line. From the beginning it will have been for
Benjamin a question of refunctioning the "tender empiricism" of a Goethe (1.1.60).
"Everything factual is already theory" (Br 443;C 313).45 This will come to apply,
mutatis mutandis, to the neo-Platonic saving of the phenomena proposed in the preface
to the Trauerspielbuch ("The value of fragments of thought is all the more decisive the
less immediate their relationship is to the underlying idea" [1.1.208;OGT 29]); to the
artless art of the vanished storyteller (" it is half the art of storytelling to keep a story
free from explanation" [II.1.445;ILL 89]); and to the "technique" presented by the
Passagenwerk ("Method of this work: literary montage. I need say nothing. Only
show...." [V.574]). Whatever the shift-Benjamin himself describes it as nothing short
of "total revolution" [vollkommenen Umwdlzung] (Br 659;C 486) - between the earlier
"metaphysical" (Benjamin's word) problematic and the cultural materialist agenda of
the late work, the micrological commitment to the object would persistently forswear
every claim of a panoptic theory and thus any stable or consistent totalization of what
appears. If the "saving of the phenomena" coincides here (as always) with the "presen-
tation of ideas" (1.1.215;OGT 35), this is precisely because the phenomena are to be
divested of any self-subsistent or "integral" unity or intactness, and submitted to the
fracturing, dispersive and reintegrative, but also constantly self-revising combinatorial
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of thought (1.1.213;OGT 33). This marks the fundamental continuity, whatever Adorno
suspected, between the philosophical mosaic of the Trauerspielbuch and the much
maligned (by Adorno) "surrealist method."
Nothing less than life itself turns out to be at stake here. The issue ultimately con-
cerns the very possibility of resuscitation. A "hopeless fidelity to things" (1.333;OGT
156) will require nothing less than a descent to the "ashes": a turn to the most recal-
citrant or "heavy" remnant of unsublimated matter (1.334;OGT 157). If Benjamin's
version of "theory in the strictest sense" (Br 586;C 586) risks the appearance of a cer-
tain empiricism, this is precisely out of a theological ambition to "let what is 'crea-
turely' speak for itself" (Br 442;C 313): that is, to restore precisely by abstaining from
ventriloquizing or anthropomorphically representing the voice of a fallen nature and
thus indeed of a history-now-mortified-as-second-nature.46 This is the critical alchemy
(1.1.126) or "philosopher's stone" promised by the "constructive" method (Br 687;
C 507) - hope for the hopeless (cf 1.1.201) - the allegorical gaze directed towards
that which in its very transience and ruination figures precisely as the cipher of resur-
rection (cf 1.1.405f;OGT 232). "In the monad," writes Benjamin, "everything that
was mythically paralyzed [in mythischer Starre lag] as textual evidence comes alive"
(Br 794;C 588).
Benjamin's rewriting of Goethe is crucia1.47 If Benjamin will insist for his presenta-
tion on a sense of "heightened visuality [gesteigerte Anschaulichkeit]" (V.574) exceed-
ing both the "shabbiness" of Marxist historiography and the "cheapness" of the
bourgeois kind (Y.1217), the ultimate model for such a pictorial method is to be derived
from Goethe's morphological studies (V.1033). As with the Urpflanze, the revelation of
the general in the detail involves a certain "unfolding" - "like a leaf," writes Benjamin
(V.577) - in this case, of the specific temporal constellation (never stable) within which
every "small individual moment" (Y.574) is to be inscribed.
But what is announced here as a "transposition" or "translation" [Obertragung] of
the morphological principle of observation from the "pagan context of nature into the
Jewish contexts" - plural- "of history" (Y.577) would seem to obey a familiar enough
logic of translation according to which the original (and indeed the original concept of
the originary) will by no means remain intact. Whatever else is at work in Benjamin's
"transfer" of attention from an organic nature to a nature-history stripped of all imma-
nent fulfilment, it becomes clear that the concepts of both nature and history will have
been radically transformed.
Goethe's "genial synthesis"48 of essence and appearance would have not only
involved the "ideal symbol" (VI.38) - timeless, total, instantaneous - but would have
moreover privileged the domain of biological "life" itself as the specific object of "irre-
ducible perception" (VI.38). Benjamin's montage principle, in contrast, will not only
introduce allegorical distance or non-simultaneity into the "wooded interior" (1.1.342;
OGT 165) of the monad but will, moreover, and for this very reason, force a fundamen-
tal revision of the very concept of "life" itself.
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If the micrological embrace of lumpen particularity involves as its "truly problem-
atic" assumption the desire to "give nothing up" (Y.578) - to consider nothing irre-
deemably lost or beneath consideration - this is precisely out of a conviction, nothing
less than theological, regarding the" indestructibility of the highest life in all things"
(V.573). Such an appeal to life will pre-empt any fixed antithesis between living and
dead - positive and negative, forward and backward, or, for that matter, constructive
and destructive ("and so on in infinitum") (V.573) - just as it will preclude any organi-
cist or "vulgar naturalist" (Y.575) theodicy, whether along progressive-evolutionary or
regressive Spenglerian lines (Y.573).
The familiar figures of cameraman and surgeon again converge here (as in the art-
work essay49) to initiate the caesura or cut to be inflicted on the historical corpus as
living corpse. 50 Whatever the nature of the historical materialist "operation" - freezing
the image, choosing the angle, adjusting the lighting, clicking the shutter (1.3.1165)-
it is only within the "darkroom of the lived moment" (11.3.1064) (equally the camera
obscura of ideology51) that the full "development" of the image is to be achieved. This
is in any case to be the distinguished from the "bourgeois" gape [Schauen] mesmer-
ized by the spectacle of history as a display of "colourful images" (1.3.1165). A con-
stant shift in visual perspective [Verschiebung des Gesichtswinkels] (V.573) eventually
presents every negative as positive according to a theology of "historical apokatastasis"
-the heretical source is Origen (cf II.2.458;1LL 103)-until at the "high noon of
history" (V.603), and out of the "dialectical nuances" (V.573) of the messianic optic
("light for shade, shade for light" [1.3.1165], and so on), "life springs anew" (Y.573).
"As flowers turn their heads towards the sun, so by dint of a secret kind of heliotropism
the past strives to turn towards that sun which is rising in the sky of history. The his-
torical materialist must understand this most inconspicuous of all transformations"
(I.2.695;1LL 255).
Adorno, notwithstanding, will suspect here an unsublimated naturalist residue - if
not, in fact, something like the "neo-paganism" parodied by Baudelaire. If the con-
structive method will be attacked for collapsing the precarious dialectic of concept and
intuition, rationality and mimesis, universal and particular, this is because, like every
empiricism, it will be found to bear the stain of a reason which would mask its own
domination over the very object it would claim to let speak. Underpinning the theoreti-
cal modesty which abstains from conceptual intervention would be the secret hubris of
a rationality intent on mastering the very nature that it would redeem. This is
Odysseus, strapped to the mast, entranced by a siren song whose ultimate charm will
amount to nothing more than the self-seduction of his own controlling ego. 52 Thus the
"philosopher's stone" would cloak arrogance as humility. It will indeed be Benjamin's
own project which will stand ultimately convicted of self-sanctification.
Gretel once joked that you lived in the cavelike depths of your Arcades and there-
fore shrank in horror from completing the work because you feared having to leave
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what you built. So let us encourage you to allow us into the holy of holies. I believe
you have no reason to be concerned for the stability of the shrine, or any reason to
fear that it will be profaned. (Br 788;C 583)
I want to love and perish that an image not remain a mere image
Nietzsche
It is perhaps unnecessary here to recite at length the familiar chorus of defences: what is
"dialectical" about the image is, for Benjamin, precisely what should preclude any
assimilation into the continuum of mythic time. The specific historicity of the image
would exclude equally both nostalgia and prognostication, and would as such under-
mine any evidential or pictorial relation to what might come. As already effectively
past, or on the verge of disappearing (1.2.S90;CB 87) - the model of monetary inflation
is never distant (cf 11.2.620) - the image disturbs all contemplative reconstruction and
so too every consoling blueprint of what might be. Jung and Fourier would here be
symmetrically deflected.
As the memory of a lost future and the anticipation of a future absence - "sadness
for what was and hopelessness towards what is to come" (1.2.S86;CB 82) - the image in
fact expresses the rigorously traumatic structure of all experience. The logic of latency
would introduce a fundamental anachrony to the image such that any and every antici-
pation of redemption - the "classless society" - would appear as at once not only radi-
cally precipitate but indeed properly legible only posthumously if not, indeed, too late.
If the much-trumpeted Auseinandersetzung (V.1160) with Jung, Klages, and company
never properly as such transpires (indeed it is tempting to blame Adorno himself as
much as anyone for this deferral), it becomes clear that any image of Urgeschichte
could point only to an "origin" fractured by a retroactivity which would pre-empt all
retrieval and thus equally every secure vision of a future or consummated end. If in the
dialectical image the mutual illumination between past and present is typically charac-
terized as both "f1ashlike" (Y.S76) and "explosive" (V.1032), this is because what is
ruptured here is both the immanence of every epoch and the immanence of subjectivity,
whether of an individual or of a phantom collectivity hypostastized in Jungian garb.
"The place where one encounters [the image] is language" (Y.S77). If the "authentic
image" is the "read image" (Y.S78f) - the familiar Barthesian problematic opens up
here s3 - this is precisely because the "point" [Punktum] of legibility involves the recog-
nition of the now-time of interpretation in its most "critical, dangerous" responsibility
towards the past (V.S78). Such punctuality would indeed shatter [zerspringen] any time-
less plenitude of truth and thus every contemplative relationship to what appears.
The temporal structure of the image converts seeing into reading, image into text. If
what is essential about the image is that it is "not seen before being remembered"
(1.3.1064), every prophesy would inevitably become but the guilty prophesy of a present
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that cannot fail to come too late (cf V.598). "Hell is nothing that awaits us but this life
here" (Strindberg) (Y.592). This will in fact define the essential shape of Benjamin's
iconoclasm. "To worship the image of divine justice in language... that is the genuinely
Jewish somersault" by which the mythic spell is to be broken (II.1.367;R 254).
Conjurations
Nor need we now rehearse the inevitable ripostes and rejoinders. If Adorno's somewhat
hysterical rhetoric of exorcism follows a predictable enough logic of conjuration -
demonology/counter-demonology54 - it will not take much to expose Adorno's own
secret reliance on the phantasmagoria he would seek to "liquidate" (Br 784;C 580).
Thus the frantic appeal to "mediation" as the magic wand which is to "break the spell"
(Br 786;C 582) of a "satanic" (Br 783;C 579) positivity.
The charges are by now familiar: Adorno the "devil" (Lyotard), Adorno the "witch"
(Agamben), Adorno the drunk, hooked on the "mysticism of the dialectical reversal"
(Biirger).55 Does not the invocation of the "total process" [Gesamtprozess] (Br 785;C
582), to "development" [Durchfiihrung] (Br 783;C 580), to "more dialectic" - more
thoroughgoing, indeed perhaps more continuous dialectic, durchdialektisieren - does
not this demand for mediation threaten precisely to reinstate a historicist continuity of
the most orthodox Lukacsian sort?56 Hegel contra Schelling? Does not the demand for
theoretical elaboration threaten to reinvest the "contents of consciousness" with the
occult properties which are specifically to be avoided? "Restoration of theology"
(Adorno's request) (Br 676;C 498) as so much more German ideology?
More to the point: does not the very accusation of apologetics assume a linear tem-
porality of the noch nicht? Would not the charge of premature reconciliation arrogate
to itself the very standard of fulfilment which it would thereby withhold? Would not
the very allegation of positivism essentially indict itself in appealing to the proscribed
standpoint of totality? Things are complicated. It is indeed possible to argue here (as
Benjamin almost does) that Adorno's own version of "theory" - whether as the esoteric
redemption of the phenomena (Ideologiekritik) or as the bootstrapping of a philosoph-
ical Miinchhausen - itself assumes the angelic standpoint or "waxen wings" (Br 793;C
587) of the detached observer. If there is, to be sure, a certain vanguardist conceit in
Adorno's "carpings" (Br 683;C 503) (most clearly marked in his response to the art-
work essay57), Adorno himself is the first to insist that the price of theoretical success
would be not only practical failure but indeed a theoretical blindspot premised precisely
on the repression of that original guilt.
If there is a wilful stupidity here - Adorno stubbornly mistakes the dream-image for
the dialectical image thereby inviting all the inevitable refutations and rejoinders - the
misprision is revealing in that it points to a specific antinomy not yet properly
addressed.
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It may indeed be that Adorno's suspicions in the end, and despite everything, retain
a certain cogency. Perhaps both Benjamin and Adorno share a certain fantasy of pre-
mature reconciliation. Perhaps such a fantasy is a necessary one. Suspended between
the "desert" of the nineteenth century (V.366) and the "icy desert of abstraction" (NL
571/224), the struggle between Moses and Aaron would seem unbearably long.
Does Benjamin's commitment to a fracturing of totality inevitably reinstate it at a
higher level? If there is something resembling historicism in the indiscriminacy of the
montage, this is precisely insofar as it would risk arrogating to itself the divine perspec-
tive - the "equal value" of Leopold von Ranke's unmittelbar zu Gatt, Hermann Lotze's
"miraculous vision" - from which alone redemption in the strict sense is to be
thought. 58 Does Rettung here confuse itself with Erlosung?59 If the determination to
give nothing up is, as Benjamin himself concedes, "truly problematic" (Y.578), this is
perhaps not automatically due to a simple empiricism or intuitionism but rather (which
may however in the end not be so very different) to the secret hubris that would antici-
pate the perspective of a memory accessible exclusively to God (ef IY.1. 10;ILL 70). Is the
heap or aggregate of images structured by the regulative ideal of the totality?
If, "to be sure" [freilich] - strange concession - "it is only to a redeemed humanity
that the past becomes citable in each and everyone of its moments" [in jeder ihrer
Momente: admittedly, not "all" but "each and every" in its singularity] (1.2.694;ILL
254), does the historian here turn into the chronicler who would assume the very
reconciliation which would by that very token be rendered void? Does the "weak
Messianic power" secretly claim an omnipotence which would subvert even a partial
intervention into the past? Whatever the distinction between the consoling universal
history of historicism and the "esperanto" proper to the Messianic (1.3.1239), does
not the historical materialist risk both, and precisely in the same measure, insofar as
he would surreptitiously occlude and thereby hypostatize the present conditions of both
thought and deed? If "every second" becomes "the narrow gate through which the
Messiah might enter" (1.2.704;ILL 264) - yes, "the" Messiah - how is this different
from the homogenizing abstractness which would efface the absolute singularity of the
revolutionary event? Does the leap into the "open air" of history (1.2.701;ILL 261)
inevitably reinforce the very confinement it would circumvent? Abstract negativity as
the secret positivism of the day?60
If to make such a charge (as Adorno arguably could have done) is in itself equally
to risk being tarred with the brush of a complacent historicism - to charge premature
reconciliation is in itself to assume it, and so on - this in itself points to the inextricable
interlocking of two "torn halves of a freedom" (as Adorno himself was famously to
characterize the stand-off in another context) to which "they do not, however, add
up" (1.3.1003). Is Adorno equally guilty of that abstract negativity which would in-
evitably (Hegel) embrace the present in the exquisite gratification of its own despair? Is
this then the interminable stand-off between the beautiful soul and its impatiently naive
adversary?
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It is perhaps not a question of decision here. However one is to (mis)construe the
terms of the Auseinandersetzung - autonomous art vs. mass culture, concept vs. intu-
ition, transcendence vs. immanence, consciousness-raising vs. redemptive criticism, sci-
entific vs. utopian socialism, rationalism vs. romanticism, Moses vs. Aaron, Jeremiah
vs. Ezekiel (the oppositions are not unrelated, but by no means identical) - the very
persistence of the antinomy points in itself to something irresolvable for thought.
Whatever the differences, in the end, between negative dialectics and dialectics at a
standstill, the entanglement in itself points to a permanent antinomy facing thought. If
both Adorno and Benjamin inevitably transgress the Bilderverbot in their most strenu-
ous efforts to honour it, this in itself points to an impatience founded in the radical
non-synchronicity of every time. The logic of latency could mean nothing other than
the risky venture of an image that cannot fail to come "too early" - but equally "too
late." There is in this sense always a little Fourier mixed into every imagination. It may
indeed be, for this reason (as Franz Rosenzweig was to have insisted61 ), that false
Messianism inevitably comes to define not only the obstacle but equally the very possi-
bility of redemption. Shooting the clocktowers (d I.2.702;ILL 262) would at the very
least shatter any illusion that either redemption or indeed its image could ever come on
time. That should equally preclude any easy ontologizing of the issue which would
efface the specific urgency of an imperative all the more pressing for appearing
inevitably too late.
It would in this light be tempting but scarcely sufficient to conclude here, as Adorno
winds up Minima Moralia, with the observation that "beside the demand thus placed
on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters"
(MM §153).
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